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Abstract 
We treat government concessions as additions to an expected payoffs schedule rather than as being synonymous 
with it. Government concessions that add to terrorists’ expected payoffs past some point on a positively sloped 
risk-reward trade-off schedule will not make all terrorists more risk seeking. Such concessions do not represent 
certain ‘windfall gains’ to terrorists of the kind that interact with relative and absolute risk aversion. Although 
the expected payoffs to higher risk actions may be augmented by the government’s concessions, terrorists must 
still bear risk in order to attain them. Terrorist groups that were unwilling to bear that risk before will not be 
enticed to bear it after expected payoffs are enhanced. Conversely, negative concessions or penalties will make 
terrorists more averse to risk because penalties alter the risk-reward trade-off in ways that make lower-risk 
actions more desirable to risk-averse terrorists. Our paper also explores the risk-reward characteristics of new 
and innovative terrorist actions relative to the structure of an existing expected payoffs schedule.  
Keywords: terrorism, government policy, concessions, penalties, risk, innovation, Red Army Faction, 2nd of 
June Movement 
1. Introduction 
In a grainy black and white photograph taken in early 1975, a weary man stares obediently into the camera. The 
sign he is holding says in block capital lettering, “PETER LORENZ—GEFANGENER DER BEWEGUNG 2. 
JUNI.” (Note 1) Peter Lorenz was a German politician and mayoral candidate for West Berlin. He was 
kidnapped by the 2nd of June Movement a few days before the mayoral elections in February 1975. After five 
days, the German government agreed to grant several concessions to the terrorists on the condition that Lorenz 
be released unharmed. These concessions included the release of 5 prisoners, transport to Yemen, about 100,000 
Deutschmark in cash and media coverage of the departing 707 from Frankfurt airport (Winkler, 2008, p.246). 
Upon receipt of these concessions, Lorenz was released. The conventional wisdom that terrorists should never be 
negotiated with was disregarded. It would, however, be reinstated in just a matter of weeks as the German 
government confronted another set of terrorist demands, this time from the Red Army Faction (RAF) who were 
holding twelve hostages in the German embassy in Stockholm.  
Members of the RAF stormed the embassy building in Stockholm in April 1975. Twelve hostages were seized. 
Explosives were laid in the building. The terrorists demanded the release of 26 prisoners, a 707 aircraft waiting 
at Frankfurt airport for departure, 520,000 Deutschmark and live television coverage in Sweden and Germany. 
This time, the German government voted in favour of a ‘no concessions’ policy on the grounds that the RAF 
terrorists were in a compromised position, the demands from the terrorists were too heavy and that further 
concessions to terrorists would not reflect favourably on the government. What must have been of some concern 
is the possibility that concessions granted to the 2nd of June Movement during the Lorenz kidnapping might 
have encouraged the RAF to undertake their own actions. The idea that a terrorist group can force the release of 
political prisoners was ‘in the air’ to such a degree that it was incorporated by well-known filmmaker Werner 
Fassbinder into a film he was making at the time of the Lorenz kidnapping (Winkler 2008, p.248). The timing of 
the Lorenz kidnapping and the Stockholm embassy incident could certainly be expected to have reinforced the 
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conventional wisdom that concessions make terrorists more likely to engage in terrorist activity and, perhaps, to 
engage in riskier acts of terrorism.  
The optimality of the ‘never negotiate’ policy was subjected to theoretical scrutiny by Lapan and Sandler (1988) 
but the analysis did not treat risk preferences explicitly. It is not uncommon for analytical work to leave risk 
preferences implicit and where risk preferences have been incorporated into the analysis, it has been usual to 
specify a particular type or level of risk preference, hold that specification constant, and explore the impact of 
government concessions in a comparative statics framework. Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley’s (1983) analysis is 
an example (Note 2). These economic studies focus on hostage-taking or kidnapping scenarios where terrorists 
attempt to bargain with the government in order to extract concessions. The examples with which we opened the 
paper are typical. Risk preferences have been treated in a similar manner in the international relations literature 
where the focus has been on inter-group or international conflict. Risk preferences are specified and the solution, 
if any, to the bargaining problem is determined within the boundaries of that specification. An example is 
Powell’s (2002) analysis which represents an assessment of Rubinstein’s (1982) ‘standard model’ under 
conditions of risk neutrality. Powell’s analysis applies to scenarios where a ‘bargaining surplus’ may be divided 
in different proportions between the ‘players’.  
Analytical solutions to a number of the problems that are explored in this and related literature are often more 
easily attainable when risk preferences are left to one side or where risk neutrality is assumed. This leaves open 
the possibility for obtaining additional results by exploring what happens when risk preferences are specified in 
different ways. Skaperdas (2006) operates first under the assumption of risk neutrality before exploring the 
implications of risk aversion. Related concepts that emerged with the publication and dissemination of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979; 1992) presentation of prospect theory, especially their concept of loss aversion, 
have been inserted into bargaining theory. Butler (2007) is representative of modern studies that explore the 
implications of different psychological and strategic aspects of bargaining, including different treatments of risk 
preferences, in scenarios previously explored with less nuanced specifications of attitudes towards the risk and 
potential losses and potential gains. Butler (2007), for example, finds important qualifications to the types of 
conclusions that might be reached by approaching bargaining problems from an expected value maximisation 
perspective—Fearon’s (1995) model, for instance—rather than a prospect theoretical perspective (Note 3).  
We are focused on the following problem. Can government concessions or penalties shape terrorists’ preferences 
for risk? (Note 4) The setting for this problem is broader than the bargaining scenarios analysed in the papers 
listed above. The setting is a terrorism context where there are expected payoffs to terrorist actions, which 
include assassination, hijacking, bombing, hostage-taking and armed assaults. What these expected payoffs may 
be is still a matter for debate but they may include some or all of the following: the infliction of fatalities, the 
garnering of media coverage, the fostering of grassroots support, the formation of strategic links with other 
like-minded terrorist groups and so on (Abrahms 2006; 2008; 2011). We do not treat the concessions—ransoms, 
release of prisoners, changes of government policy and so forth—that might come from the government in 
response to an act of terrorism as the payoffs to terrorism. Rather, the government’s concessions or penalties 
schedule adds to or alters but does not replace an underlying expected payoffs schedule that is characterised by a 
particular trade-off between risk and reward.  
The paper attempts to bring terrorism researchers’ attention to theoretical advances in parts of the economics 
literature that might otherwise go unnoticed. The distinguishing feature of the paper is its treatment of risk 
preferences as being shaped by the government’s decisions regarding concessions and penalties rather than, as 
has been traditional, exploring the impact of different decisions under different specifications of terrorists’ 
preferences for risk. We avoid treating concessions as being the payoff to the terrorism because Ross (2004, p. 
216) has shown that replacing an entire incentives or payoffs schedule with a compensation or concessions 
schedule leads to theoretical results that are difficult to interpret in real-world settings. To clearly distinguish 
between total expected payoffs and concessions that represent additions or alterations to those payoffs, the 
theoretical apparatus that we apply to the analysis of the effect of government concessions and penalties on 
terrorists’ risk preferences sets the expected payoffs schedule and concessions schedule side-by-side such that 
the effect of concessions on expected payoffs is clearly delineated. Terrorists’ choices of actions on the basis of 
the risks and rewards reflected in the expected payoffs schedule can then be examined to determine whether the 
alteration of the risk-reward trade-off inherent in the expected payoffs schedule can be expected to influence 
terrorists’ decisions regarding the amount of risk they are willing to bear.  
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2. The Shape of Payoffs, Concessions and Penalties 
Terrorists confront an expected payoffs schedule characterised by some, presumably positive, trade-off between 
risk and reward. Powell (2002) utilises a purely theoretical risk-reward trade-off. Phillips (2009) treats inflicted 
human tragedy measured by injuries and fatalities as the payoff to terrorism and sees a positive trade-off between 
risk and reward emerging empirically from the RAND-MIPT data as a concave set in expected-payoff-risk space. 
In dealing with bargaining scenarios it is easy to confuse a total payoffs schedule with the government’s 
concessions schedule. The two will only be synonymous if concessions are the only relevant payoffs to a 
terrorist action. Usually, though, there will be some payoffs that lie outside of the government’s control or its 
policy-making regimes. As mentioned in the introduction, these could be one or a combination of many different 
factors and some of them might be intangible or psychic in nature. A government’s concessions schedule may 
alter or add to the existing expected payoffs schedule but it is not synonymous with it and does not replace it.  
A payoffs schedule that incorporates all of the payoffs to terrorism, assuming they can all be measured (Note 5), 
would be multi-dimensional. We can imagine, however, that the payoffs schedule will be positively inclined in 
risk-reward space in order to encompass the positive trade-off between risk and reward that confronts terrorists. 
As Phillips (2009) has shown, different types of terrorist actions can be combined. When risk is measured by 
standard deviation or variance and the payoffs to each type of action are imperfectly correlated, a positively 
inclined and concave payoffs schedule emerges in risk-reward space. It is positively inclined because terrorist 
actions with a higher average payoff are attended by a higher risk or variance of their outcomes. It is concave 
because imperfect correlation between the payoffs to the different types of terrorism—payoffs to different 
actions do not move perfectly together over time—introduces concavity as an important aspect of the statistical 
structure. Only perfectly correlated payoffs across terrorist actions will produce a linear risk-reward trade-off. 
This concave trade-off between risk and reward that emerges when average payoffs and variance are considered 
in a context where terrorist actions can be combined is the clearest picture available of the type of statistical 
properties that may characterise the terrorists’ total or overall payoffs schedule.  
We could examine a basic but unrealistic situation where a government’s ‘schedule of concessions’ replaces or 
becomes synonymous with the total payoffs schedule. However, unless we are willing to assume that 
concessions from the government are the only payoffs to terrorism this approach would lead us into the 
difficulties identified by Ross (2004, p.216). Even if we could make such an assumption the resulting analysis 
would, at best, apply only to a very small number of terrorist actions. The problem of government concessions in 
a terrorism context must be approached by treating the government’s concessions schedule as something that 
alters or adds to the payoffs schedule but does not replace it. If the payoffs schedule is characterised by a 
particular trade-off between risk and reward an alteration of or addition to the payoffs schedule may change this 
risk-reward trade-off. It is possible that the alteration or addition could increase the payoffs to risky terrorist 
actions. However, this is different from making those riskier actions more desirable from a terrorist’s point of 
view. Only if the concessions schedule alters the terrorists’ risk preferences in a manner that makes them more 
risk seeking will riskier actions—even those attended by higher payoffs than before—be desired by terrorists. 
If a payoffs schedule to terrorism might be conceived of as depicting a trade-off between risk and reward that is 
positively inclined and probably concave, the concessions and penalties that might be expected to characterise 
the government’s strategy or policy towards terrorists must also be shaped in some way. The ‘shape’ of the 
government’s concessions schedule is important. Recent work in other parts of economics, especially the 
analyses prepared by Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004), has focused on the convexity and concavity of 
‘incentives schedules’. The problem addressed in the literature that encompasses agency theory and theoretical 
finance theory or financial economics is analogous to ours. Their problem is to alter or add to a total 
remuneration schedule with an incentives schedule in order to entice the individual being remunerated to take 
more or less risk. The language used in this contemporary literature speaks of convexifying or concavifying a 
utility function. A schedule that convexifies a utility function makes the individual more risk seeking. A 
schedule that concavifies a utility function makes the individual more averse to risk. The ‘folklore’, as Ross 
(2004) calls it, in financial economics and agency theory had been that a convex schedule convexifies a utility 
function while a concave schedule concavifies it. The shape, convex or concave, of the government’s 
concessions schedule is central to our problem.  
A convex schedule of concessions is one that will magnify the payoffs to terrorism past some point. The reason 
why this might be thought to decrease terrorists’ aversion to risk and make them more risk seeking is that the 
effect of such a concession is to ‘steepen’ past some level of risk the positively inclined risk-reward trade-off 
characterising the expected payoffs schedule. Past some point of either payoff or risk, depending on how one 
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they are successful at it, the government may use positively valued concessions to alleviate the crisis without 
making terrorists more risk seeking.  
The analytical treatment of concessions within the terrorism studies literature is quite advanced but relevant 
results can be found in a research program that is ongoing in other parts of economics. Both Ross (2004) and 
Carpenter (2000) make some progress in identifying the conditions under which a convex schedule will 
convexify an agent’s utility function. The type of problem that Ross and Carpenter address is a part of the 
research program directed towards the investigation of the principal-agent problem. In turn, parts of this research 
program fall under the broader research program that investigates the role of incentives in economic 
decision-making and risk taking (Note 11). This literature has received an additional boost following the 
financial crisis of 2008 where excessive risk taking and misaligned incentives figured prominently in the 
analytical post-mortems carried out over the ensuing several years (Note 12). The number of theoretical 
advances since Ross (2004) has not been substantial and his paper remains among the few to rigorously address 
the problem of whether convex schedules convexify an agent’s utility function (Note 13).  
Granting concessions may not be a sub-optimal negotiation strategy but will granting concessions make terrorists 
more risk seeking? Will granting concessions that increase the expected payoffs to more risky terrorist actions 
entice terrorists to engage in those actions? We have addressed this question in this paper. Convex positively 
valued concessions that increase the expected payoffs to risky terrorist actions will not make ‘terrorists’ as a 
general category more risk seeking. This result emerges clearly when the concessions schedule is treated as 
being distinct from the expected payoffs schedule. Existing theoretical work has often focussed on exploring 
decision-making within scenarios where the concessions that may be received from the government are the 
terrorists’ payoffs. Our treatment, by contrast, sets down an expected payoffs schedule that is altered by the 
imposition of positive or negative government concessions. Expected payoffs are risky and the actual outcomes 
of a terrorist action may diverge from those that were expected. Linked as they are in our analysis to the payoffs 
to risk actions, positive concessions are also risky and uncertain. Although they may increase the expected 
payoffs to more risky terrorist actions, positive concessions do not represent additions to the terrorists’ 
accumulated payoffs, resources or ‘wealth’. The expected payoffs schedule is altered but not in a manner that 
entices the utility maximising risk averse terrorist to engage in riskier actions.  
A research program that explores the relationship between incentives, broadly speaking, and terrorist behaviour 
may be either mathematical or more logical-theoretical in nature. A mathematical approach would build upon the 
types of results found in Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004) and Braido and Ferreira (2006). In particular, it would be 
interesting to prove that the results contained in Ross (2004) apply in situations where a terrorist group 
dynamically accumulates actual payoffs and concessions over time in a series of terrorist actions. Such an 
analysis would highlight the relevance of decreasing and increasing absolute risk aversion in the examination of 
terrorist choices in a dynamic setting. Higher mathematics is not the only pathway that may be followed. 
Incentives shape terrorists’ behaviours in ways that can be explored through logical argument. This paper has 
pointed out that terrorists’ expected payoffs may be altered by the imposition of concessions and this, in turn, 
may shape terrorists’ choices of risky actions. Two important problems that may be approached in a similar 
manner concern the examination of the interaction between incentives provided within a terrorist group and the 
choices of terrorists associated with that group and the examination of the effects of attempts by terrorist groups 
to resource, encourage or incentivise lone individual terrorists (Note 14) who are operating more or less 
independently in dispersed locations. The use of different methods, some drawn from research in other parts of 
economics, to explore terrorist behaviour will likely yield some worthwhile results.  
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Notes 
Note 1. Peter Lorenz—prisoner of the Movement 2 June. 
Note 2. Also see Landes (1978), Enders and Sandler (1993), Enders and Sandler (2002), Frey and Luechinger 
(2003) and Siqueira and Sandler (2006). 
Note 3. O’Neill’s (2001) discussion of the treatment of risk aversion within international relations theory 
contributes the background to this discussion. 
Note 4. The ‘conventional wisdom’ might be interpreted as follows: governments should not negotiate with 
terrorists because doing so will encourage terrorism. Lapan and Sandler (1988) looked into the optimality of a 
‘never negotiate’ strategy but did not address what seems to be another aspect of the conventional wisdom. That 
is, granting the terrorists some concessions emboldens them. This could be taken to mean that it encourages 
more risk seeking. 
Note 5. An economist’s approach might be to use monetary equivalents (Enders and Sandler 2002). 
Note 6. ‘Wealth’ is the accumulated payoffs of the terrorist or terrorist group or the terrorist or terrorist group’s 
resources. It might have a monetary equivalent or it might not. The terrorists’ ‘wealth’ is assumed to interact 
with the terrorists’ relative and absolute risk aversion in the same sense that monetary wealth interacts with an 
economic agent’s risk aversion in more orthodox settings. 
Note 7. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, much stricter prison sentences were imposed for aircraft 
‘skyjacking’ after a spate of incidences (see Landes 1978). This can be analysed as negative additions to the 
existing expected payoffs schedule. 
Note 8. See Ross’s second theorem and its fourth corollary (p.216-217). 
Note 9. An individual’s utility is described by both relative and absolute risk aversion (see Pratt 1964). Different 
specifications of the utility function (power, exponential, logarithmic and quadratic) are characterised by 
different types of relative and absolute risk aversion. A popular specification is ‘decreasing absolute risk 
aversion’ (DARA). Individuals with decreasing absolute risk aversion allocate more resources to risky actions as 
payoffs accumulate. 
Note 10. This is a government’s negative concessions or penalties schedule. In this case, relevant causes of death 
do not include the terrorist’s suicide. 
Note 11. See the review by Windram (2005). 
Note 12. For example, see Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). 
Note 13. See Braido and Ferreira (2006), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006), Panageas and Westerfield (2009), 
Dong, Wang and Xie (2010), Tchistyi, Yermack and Yun (2011) and Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013). 
Note 14. These could be thought of as ‘quasi’ lone wolves. A true lone wolf terrorist operates alone. 
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